Jungian Personality Types

[marmalade]

This an introductory thread to Jungian personality typology.

Type test(I'd be intereested to see what the most prevalent types are around here)
http://www.humanmetrics.com/cgi-win/JTypes1.htm

Thread with a bunch of good links to info:
http://www.mbticentral.com/forums/mbti-enneagram-other-personality-...

I can offer any other info that anyone would desire. The archetypal roles of the functions are very helpful to figuring out your type. Also, for the scientific-minded, there is some interesting research out there about MBTI and about how MBTI correlates with other tests such as FFM(traits theory).

[marmalade]

People are harder to type as they age. Life experiences cause us to develop different sides to our personalities. Such on-line tests are only partially helpful. If you're truly interested, I'd recommend looking at descriptions of the two types and the functional breadkdown of both in terms of archetypal roles. Another way to clarify your type is by visiting type forums. There is an INTJ forum and MBTIcentral has many INTJs and INFJs.

I've never taken the actual MBTT. I've always tested as INFP, all of the descriptions I've found fit me, and the functional ordering makes sense of my experience.

[Gypsy]

INTJ
33 75 6 44

are there only introverts on here?

[Gypsy]

And your very interesting description was reflecting which developmental level exactly? I could not make a guess (too new and unaquantied with the intricacies of Integral Psychology), but I would think the very same type of experience you describe could be experienced quite differently at different structures of consciousness... If you could translate it to at least two neighboring levels (below and above of that actual level in your text) , that would be really helpful (for me).

[Gypsy]

I vaguely remember Ken Wilber saying somewhere that the types are much more different across (vertically) levels, than among themselves (horizontally). I.e. an INTJ at level 2 would be much more different from and INTJ at level 3 than from an ENFS at level 2. I grasp these things much better through actual examples (like your previous post) than through a theoretical outline, that is why I was asking for a translation of your example to another level (structure of consciousness). But what you wrote is still very informative, thanks!

Also, is it possible to introspectively notice that one is at first or second tier (using the term in a sense of levels/stages of consciousness)? I thought these were not noticable through introspection (unlike states)?

[MetroPunk]

the types are much more different across (vertically) levels, than among themselves (horizontally). I.e. an INTJ at level 2 would be much more different from and INTJ at level 3 than from an ENFS at level 2.

exactly, looking at types without levels will get us nowhere.
the complexity of self as it moves through states, levels and structures can be very idiosyncratic with rhythms unique to those people.

[marmalade]

I think looking at either without the other will get us nowhere... as far as understanding these things in our lived experience. The more factors we take into account, then the more accurate will be our understanding. I wonder if some horizontal differences get misperceived as developmental differences. Two people on the same level might look very different because of type or other factors.

I'd love to see someone attempt a detailed explanation of how these different models interact in actual people.

[marmalade]

These criticisms are generally valid, but there are responses one can give. For instance, I think MBTI and related theories have made a point to show that type isn't simplistically deterministic, but it does seem that Jung had some strong deterministic leanings.

http://www.fordham.edu/philosophy/davenport/texts/jungmyer.htm

"In closing, I think it will be helpful to present a condensed review of the criticisms I have made against personality type theory, at least in the form it is taking in psychology today. Although several of this points are related, they constitute distinct and separately identifiable problems for the underpinning presuppositions of personality type inventories. And it is this relative independence of so many serious difficulties that suggests just how far from reliable the psychology presented in such personality theories really is."

"-- Naivity in Measurement: Type-trait theories work from concepts of dispositions that generally have broad meanings which have been interpreted different ways in the philosophical discourse of moral psychology, but have often inherit limited, impoverished, or otherwise idiosyncratic construals of these dispositional traits that were fixed earlier in psychoanalytic discourse. Thus, their practitioner's belief that these questions will elicit evidence of just these traits is both subjective and unsupported on its face and often highly distortive. There are several problems here: (A) the questions may be phrased in ways that carry skewed implications about the trait they are being used to measure; (B) a `yes' or `no' answer to the questions could in some cases be evidence not of the disposition which the term actually refers to, but of several others; (C) there may be other questions or observations that would be much better indicators of what this trait-term means; (D) the very concept of the disposition being measured for may be unclear or gerrymandered, the result of a mistaken interpretative focus in earlier moral psychology, and so this single `trait' is actually a partial conglomerate of several other more basic dispositional features."

"-- Relevance and Hidden Variable Problems for Factor-Analysis: Type-trait theorists tend to insist that their results are not philosophically criticizable because they are at least potentially supported by rigorously scientific methodology. The methodology in which they place such faith is regression and factor-analysis to determine if correlations are relevant, if trait-continuaa are orthogonally independent of each other, and if the traits they have selected to measure are `real,' or actually non-independent parts of other traits, or linkages of multiple more basic traits, etc. But this method cannot by itself assure us that other hidden variables would not split observed correlations, link factors formerly thought to be independent, or produce more significant correlations. In addition, it cannot assure us that the variables the analysis has identified are relevant for personality, since that concept has a normative dimension that may reduce the importance of factors the models include, or point to the importance of factors it has not even tried to test for."

"-- Leveling: The type-trait approach treats what may be intrinsically different kinds of factors that help account for consistency of behavior indirectly in interaction with situations, but treats them all as if they were just the same kind of thing of thing --namely traits or types (complexes of traits)-- and thus metaphysically on a par. In particular, these theories tend not to recognize hierarchical differences, i.e. that some `traits' may constitute not tendencies or attitudes simpliciter, but tendencies or attitudes about other traits --a point brought out in recent moral psychology."

"-- False Neutrality: Because they mix together fundamentally different kinds of dispositions, type-trait theories inevitably include --right along with traits that describe different cognitive approaches and interaction styles with no apparent ethical implications-- several other trait-contrasts that reflect moral character, or the `virtues and vices' of the person. Yet because contemporary type-trait theories are at pains to proclaim that the results of their analysis are passing no judgment on the individual, they ingenuously construe every difference in disposition as a `gift' and suggest in practice that none is inherently `bad' or less likely to contribute to human flourishing. This ignores basic insights of the virtue-theory tradition in moral psychology, which recognizes the ineliminably evaluate content of a distinct set of dispositions that are related to choice."

"-- Omission and Bipartitism: Because historical biases unconsciously derived from inadequate moral psychologies influence the selection of relevant traits and types for testing, and the interpretation of what kinds of questions will elicit which traits, type-trait theories of personality tend to leave out altogether, or at least dramatically underemphasize, certain relevant trait and trait-complexes, in particular those relating to volition in the sense distinct from both affect and detached cognition. Type-trait portraits of the `personality palatte' thus typically imply no room for a `middle part of the soul,' and revolve around a global bipartite polarization of the rational vs. the emotional."

"-- Determinism: Because of their historical origins in deterministic moral psychologies, type-trait theories of personality implicitly leave no room for alternate-possibilities freedom or `liberty' in the determination of one's character, if not also in outward action. Like Leibniz, they assume that differences in attitude and behavior between individuals in similar situations must have `sufficient reason,' which can only be an innate cause rather than libertarian choice."

"-- Psychic Alchemy: Taken together, this inherent deterministic tendency in type-trait approaches, their reduction of all relevant dispositional attitudes to one generic level, and their faith in factor analysis yield the sense --which runs implicitly throughout this typology discourse-- that what is being discovered in the analysis of personality traits and types is a kind of `period table' of the basic elements of the soul: just as chemical compounds are the result of the combination of basic chemical elements, so different personalities are the result of a combination of basic dispositional elements, and the type label applying to an individual is almost analogous to a chemical formula. Not only, as we have seen, is the `palette' of dispositional `colors' from which the personality is painted in these theories incomplete; the deeper problem is that unlike molecules, personality may not in fact be a combination of elements at all. This whole paradigm, paradigm, with its associated assumption that we can `prime factor' the soul into a set of basic components, may be fundamentally in error."

"The model on which typology approaches rest is thus one of personality as a `painting' made with an array of primary `trait-colors,' which determines how it will look (perform) in the `lighting' of different situations. This model derives from the empiricist era of moral psychology, and is thus philosophically controversial and cannot be taken for granted. If unity-of-character accounts such as those often found in virtue moral psychologies are more correct, it may be misleading to such an extent that the error colors all subsequent interpretation of data gathered, and cannot reveal itself empirically. Statistical analysis of answers to subjectively designed questions that may only inadequately measure an arguably incomplete and poorly conceived set of traits can hardly contribute anything interesting towards resolving the underlying philosophical disputes at stake here."

"In closing, let me return to the point from which we set out. Some philosophers today believe that philosophers as a group (especially those working in ethics) should recognize and defer to existing `knowledge' discovered in psychology (and the sciences of the mind generally), and therefore limit their theories to those that fit with or are practicable within the frameworks set by psychology and cognitive science. The case of personality type theories, however, shows how backwards this proposed standard is. Philosophers must deal with empirical findings, but neither ethics nor the underlying metaphysics of personhood can be circumscribed in advance by supposedly scientific theories that always embed philosophically controversial assumptions. For sometimes psychologists even erect entire edifices on bits of outdated metaphyics, distorted mutations of once-clear concepts, and threads of flawed moral psychologies, sewn together hodgepodge in a tangled skein that only the philosopher can hope to untangle and follow back out of the labyrinth to their sources."

[marmalade]

The following extends the known correlations between gender and Rational functions. I don't know much about somatotypes, but the ideas about hemisphere lateralization I've come across before. Its funny that Jung thought the most feminine functions were Introverted Feeling and Extraverted Intuition. I'm a guy and those are my main functions. As far as I know, research has disproven Jung on this point. There isn't any corrlation between the Perceiving functions and gender or between Attitude and gender.

I was thinking about gender because of the thread about Gilligan. Her basic ideas seem to be true if a bit over-generalized. Approximately 40% of people don't fit the theorized gender traits.

http://www.innerexplorations.com/catpsy/t2c11.htm
Type and Gender

Beyond the obvious physical differences between men and women there are general somatotype differences. If we compare populations of men and women on the somatotype charts, men are distributed more widely, and women are less mesomorphic and more endomorphic. It's as if men are more experimental beings. Therefore, we could expect to see both a higher incidence of certain gifts and a higher incidence of certain defects, and there is evidence for both.

The distribution of women's somatotypes poses several problems for typology. It's harder to tell women apart on the basis of somatotype. The differences that separate one type from another are smaller, and it is also harder to decide how to divide the woman somatotype sample since the center has shifted more towards the endomorphic pole of the somatotype chart.

There are also differences in the distribution of the different psychological types between men and women. Jung noted some of these differences in passing in Psychological Types. When speaking of the extraverted thinking type, he says:

"In my experience this type is found chiefly among Men, since, in general, thinking tends more often to be a dominant function in men than in women. When thinking dominates in a woman it is usually associated with a predominantly intuitive cast of mind." (p. 351)

And when speaking of the extraverted feeling type he comments:

"As feeling is undeniably a more obvious characteristic of feminine psychology than thinking, the most pronounced feeling types are to be found among women." (p. 356)

He also feels that the majority of the extraverted sensation types are men (p. 363) and that the extraverted intuitive type is more common among women (p. 369). Finally, he writes:

"It is principally among women that I have found the predominance of introverted feeling." (p. 388)

Our own experience bears out Jung's when it is a question of thinking and feeling, but we have not noticed any differences in the frequency of sensation and intuition. Summed up in its simplest form men with primary or secondary feeling or women with primary or secondary thinking are not common, to say the least. We take special notice when we meet one, and there is a real difference between a woman using her third function of thinking, a woman who is in the grip of the animus, and a woman whose thinking is typologically higher than her feeling. The same differences exist among men. This kind of development of thinking in a woman or feeling in a man is rare enough to cause special kinds of adjustment problems because of the expectations that society has. This area has gotten scarce attention, and among the different typological preferences, thinking and feeling are probably the most environmentally conditioned, making progress in this area more difficult. For example, when a new version of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator was created, the only major adjustment was in the area of thinking and feeling. Before, the distribution among males had been 60% thinking and 40% feeling, and among females, 1/3 thinking and 2/3 feeling. In a 1972 study of university of Florida freshmen, there were only 44% thinking among males and 28% among females. The scales, therefore, had to be adjusted to match the old figures, but if the scales were that environmentally conditioned, we are certainly allowed to wonder whether the initial estimation of thinking and feeling and their different scoring for men and women were also environmentally conditioned. In short, it would not be surprising if there were a lot less thinking women and feeling men than the MBTI indicates.

The possibility remains, then, that the specially constructed and adjusted scales of the MBTI which, incidentally, differ more than the other scales when compared with the Grey-Wheelwright (MBTI Manual 1985, p. 209), are weighted more to produce thinkers among women and feelers among men. "On the TF (thinking- feeling) scale, it was evident that females, even those who in their behavior and attitudes indicated a clear preference for thinking, had a greater tendency to give certain feeling responses than did males. The difference was ascribed either to the possibility that certain feeling responses were more socially desirable for females than males, or to the effect of social training." (p. 149) But what if it were not environmental reasons but innate typological reasons that produced these tendencies?

One further note. Long before we knew anything about somatotypes we met some women who typologically appeared to be intuition thinking types, and they had a distinctive body type, a sort of husky build with a great deal of ectomorphy, as well. This brings to mind Jung's intuitive cast to thinking women.

The differences between the sexes in somatotypes and psychological types should eventually be brought into relationship with recent studies in sex differences in cognition and lateralization. For example, boys tend to score higher on tests of spatial ability and girls on tests of verbal abilities. These spacial abilities include maze performance, various exercises in mental rotation and chess. Bradshaw and Nettleton in their Human Cerebral Asymmetry surmised the list might also include musical composition and mathematics (p. 215). On the other hand, women are "less susceptible to language-related disorders such as developmental dysphasia, developmental dyslexia, stuttering and infantile autism." (p. 216)

There is a certain amount of evidence that sug6gests that females are less lateralized than males and therefore show less deficits after left hemisphere traumas. If the greater lateralization of males is confirmed, it would be an internal counterpart to Sheldon's observation of the wider distribution and more experimental nature of the male somatotypes. One would suspect, as well, that the psychological types of males not only differ in frequency of type from females, but might be more extreme within the particular type. In other words, women would show more balance in the use of the various functions while men would be more exclusively one-sided. Whether this is true or not, or whether any analysis has been made or could be made of psychological type test data, I don't know.

Sheldon also indicated that the ectomorph was one of nature's most extreme experiments, and so we could expect to find both a higher incidence of these particular spatial-oriented gifts as well as developmental problems. As usual, both somatotype and psychological type are ignored in most of these studies. There are, however, several clues that point in this direction. Early maturing adolescents perform better on tests of verbal ability, and late-maturing adolescents score better on spatial ability. And since boys develop later than girls, it is suggested that "the prolonged maturation typical of males would ultimately lead to greater lateralization, greater separation of function and spatial (but not verbal) superiority, and a greater opportunity for language malfunction to occur." (Human Cerebral Asymmetry, p. 223) But as we will see in the studies on the maturation of the different somatotypes, it is the ectomorph who is the late maturer. This can be connected with studies of male rats outperforming female rats in mazes. There is also evidence "that females who are high and males who are low in the male sex hormone (androgen) score higher on spatial ability tests." (p. 218) And what males would be low in androgen if not those dwelling at the opposite poles of mesomorphy in the ectomorphic regions? From a psychological type viewpoint would Jung's women with thinking with an intuitive cast or women who are extraverted intuiters show higher androgen levels, higher spatial abilities, and more difficulties in traditional gender roles?